Jump to content

Hanafi school

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"Hanafi" redirects here. For other uses, see Hanafi (disambiguation).

Part of a series on
Sunni Islam
Beliefs
Five Pillars
Rightly-Guided Caliphs
Sunni schools of law

Others

Sunni schools of theology

In terms of Ihsan:

Contemporary movements
Holy sites
Lists
Islam portal

The Hanafi school[a] or Hanafism is one of the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence within Sunni Islam. It developed from the teachings of the jurist and theologian Abu Hanifa (c. 699–767 CE), who emphasised and systemised the use of reasoning (ra'y). Hanafi legal theory primarily derives law from the Quran, the sayings and practices of Muhammad (sunnah), scholarly consensus (ijma) and analogical reasoning (qiyas), but also privileges juristic discretion (istihsan) and local customs (urf).

The school spread throughout the Muslim world under the patronage of various Islamic empires, including the Abbasids and Seljuks. Transoxiana emerged as a centre of classical Hanafi scholarship between the 10th and 12th centuries, which gave rise to the Maturidi school of theology. The Ottoman Empire adopted Hanafism as its official school of law and influenced the legal thought of the school.

Followers of the Hanafi school are called Hanafis, who are estimated to comprise one third of all Muslims.[1] It is the largest Islamic legal school and is predominant in the Indian subcontinent, Turkey and much of the Levant.[1][2]

History

[edit]

The Hanafi school emerged from the legal tradition of Kufa in Iraq, in which its eponym Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767) resided.[3] Iraqi jurists were known for their use of independent reasoning (ra'y) in deriving law.[4] Kufa, alongside Medina and Basra, was a centre of legal activity at the beginning of the second Hijri century. Its prominent jurists included Amir al-Sha'bi, Ibrahim al-Nakha'i and Hammad ibn Abi Sulayman.[5] The opinions of Abu Hanifa and the earlier Kufan jurists closely correspond,[6] particularly those of al-Nakha'i.[7] Abu Hanifa's legal doctrine, as conveyed to his students, was predominantly derived from his own instructors, chiefly Hammad and al-Nakha'i.[8]

Formative period

[edit]
The Abu Hanifa Mosque in Baghdad, which houses the tomb of Abu Hanifa

Abu Hanifa and his students were responsible for systemising the use of ra'y,[4] of which Abu Hanifa was its "unrivalled master".[9] According to his contemporary Shu'bah, Abu Hanifa was the "most systematic jurist of his time".[10] There is no record of legal treatises authored by Abu Hanifa. His teachings were transmitted by his disciples Abu Yusuf (d. 182/798) and Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 189/804), the last of whom was the most prolific.[11] Later Hanafis termed the corpus of al-Shaybani as the "ẓāhir al-riwāya" and ascribed it an authoritative status.[12]

Early Hanafis were distinct in their extensive usage of analogical reasoning (qiyas) and adherence to analogical consistency,[13] and employed juristic discretion (istihsan) to depart from analogical reasoning when deemed appropriate.[14] Iraqi ra'y dialectics involved the interlocutors exploring a series of hypothetical legal cases to delineate the limits of legal norms.[15] In practice, it led Hanafis to favour widely-transmitted hadith, particularly those which enshrined general principles that were applicable to other cases.[16] The widespread collection of hadith led to the circulation of many reports that were unknown to the Hanafis. In response, they prioritised those known to the Iraqi legal tradition.[17] Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani separately authored works named Kitab al-Athar (lit. 'Book of Traditions'), which sought to ground Hanafi teachings in the normative precedent of the early Kufan jurists and the Kufan companions of Muhammad, notably Abd Allah ibn Mas'ud and Ali.[18]

The students of Abu Hanifa established study circles in Baghdad, an emerging hub of cultural activity and the seat of the Abbasid Caliphate.[19] The school won the support of the centralising Abbasid state, which sought to unify the legal system.[20] The Abbasids' preference for appointing Hanafi judges assisted in the spread of the school. Abu Yusuf served as a judge in Baghdad; the Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809) later appointed him as the chief judge. By the time of al-Shaybani's death, the school had established itself in Egypt and Balkh in Tokharistan.[19]

In contemporary external sources, members of the nascent school were described as the aṣḥāb abī ḥanīfa ("companions of Abu Hanifa") and the aṣḥāb al-ra’y ("companions of ra'y").[21] Early Hanafi doctrine was attacked by the ahl al-ḥadīth[b], who accused Hanafis of preferring their ra'y to hadith.[22] The identification of Hanafis with the aṣḥāb al-ra’y in contradistinction to the aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth strengthened during the resurgence of the latter following the Mihna.[23] Al-Shafi'i (d. 150/767), too, critiqued the Hanafis' treatment of hadith and their claim that their positions reflected those of the Kufan companions of Muhammad.[24] He further argued that istihsan was subjective, which later led to classical Hanafi legal theorists articulating it as being completely dependent on the primary sources of law.[25]

Classical period

[edit]
Cover of a 15th-century manuscript of a Hanafi legal work based on al-Quduri's mukhtasar

Beginning in the 9th-century, the Hanafi school began a process of evolution from a "personal school" centered around individual jurists and their study circles into a distinct legal community with a collectively-recognised doctrine and set of authoritative figures.[26] By the end of the century, the school resembled a professional body with a doctrine that was systematically transmitted from teachers to students, maturing into its classical form.[27] Al-Quduri (d. 428/1036–37)'s mukhtasar was the classical school's first work of the genre and the most authoritative after that of al-Shaybani.[28]

Over the 9th-century, the Hanafi school emerged as the prevailing school in Transoxiana and Tokharistan.[29] The school was introduced to Transoxiana by the students of Abu Hanifa and al-Shaybani, but became prevalent under the Samanids, during whose rule Hanafi scholars received official favour.[30] The Transoxianan Hanafi tradition was highly influential in defining the doctrine of the later school.[31] Works authored by Transoxianan jurists and accorded a high status in later Hanafi tradition include:

In the 10th-century, the Hanafi theologian Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 333/944) developed a kalam tradition that crystallised into the Maturidi school of theology,[35] which had descended directly from the theological views of the earliest Hanafis.[36] Due to philosophical differences, the Transoxianan Maturidis disagreed with the Mu'tazilite strain of Iraqi Hanafis on several technical points of legal theory, but saw limited success in expunging the Mu'tazilite influence.[37]

The Oghuz Turks who founded the Seljuk Empire became attached to the Transoxianan Hanafi tradition. The Seljuks favoured the eastern Hanafis and appointed them to various official positions in their new territories, encouraging their migration out of Central Asia.[38] During the Seljuk expansion of the 11th and 12th centuries, the Hanafi and Maturidi schools spread westward into Syria, Anatolia and western Persia.[11] Hanafi migration out of Central Asia accelerated during the Mongol invasions, which ravaged the region.[38]

Indian subcontinent

[edit]
William Jones' manuscript of the al-Fatāwā l-ʿĀlamgīriyya

The Hanafi school spread to India from Transoxiana and eastern Persia.[11] To consolidate control over his realm, the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) ordered the compilation of Hanafi fatwas. Completed between 1664 and 1672, the resulting al-Fatāwā l-ʿĀlamgīriyya selected legal opinions from earlier Hanafi legal works and is modelled after the Hidayah of al-Marghinani.[39]

During the colonization of India, the juristic disagreements intrinsic to Islamic jurisprudence disturbed the East India Company, who sought to create a "complete digest of Hindu and Mussulman law". The resulting Anglo-Muhammadan law was based in part on a translation of al-Marghinani's Hidayah, which was chosen for its brevity and its belonging to the Hanafi school, which most Indian Muslims followed. The project effectively codified the Hidayah, severing it from the Hanafi commentarial tradition under which it was traditionally interpreted.[40]

Ottoman period

[edit]

The Ottoman Empire adopted the Hanafi school as their official legal school.[41] The Ottomans established an extensive network of madrasas to train jurists, with the most prestigious located in Constantinople.[42] Hanafi law co-existed with the qanun (dynastic law), decrees and edicts promulgated by the sultans. The qanun often reaffirmed religious laws; in other cases, it authorised actions that the jurists opposed, such as torture.[43]

By the 16th-century, the Şeyḫülislâm emerged as the chief imperial religious and judicial authority.[44] The sultans influenced the formation of the imperial religious hierarchy by appointing muftis directly and through the Şeyḫülislâm, delineating the range of legal opinions in the Ottoman Hanafi tradition.[45] In the mid-16th century, the Şeyḫülislâm was granted the authority to admit new texts into the imperial legal canon,[46] which was studied in the imperial madrasas.[47] Many jurists from Arab provinces of the empire were critical of the imperial canon, partly because of its inclusion of later works which they judged as contradicting the preferred opinions (tarjih) of the school.[48]

A page from the Ottoman Turkish edition of the Mecelle

The Maʿrūḍāt of the Şeyḫülislâm Ebussuud Efendi (d. 982/1574), a collection of fatwas endorsed by Suleiman I, contained sultanic edicts and was frequently referenced in later Hanafi works which considered its opinions binding.[49] Late Hanafis believed that judges could act as deputies of the sultan who could thus regulate, inter alia, the legal opinions judges could reference, such as in the case of inter-school disputes.[50] In the 17th and 18th centuries, Hanafi jurists began to incorporate sultanic edicts into authoritative legal works.[50] The late Hanafis also believed studying legal works without their commentaries to be inadequate.[51]

The Radd al-Muhtar of the late Arab-Ottoman jurist Ibn Abidin (d. 1252/1836) is considered an authoritative and representative work of the late Hanafi tradition.[52] It employs legal devices such as necessity (darura) to depart from the canonical ẓāhir al-riwāya where necessary to ensure the continued relevancy of the school, and references sultanic edicts to revise the school's opinions.[53]

Between 1869 and 1877, the Ottomans promulgated the Mecelle, a codification of Hanafi jurisprudence.[54] The Mecelle was drafted by a committee led by the jurist Ahmed Cevdet Pasha,[54] who had successfully argued against the implementation of the Napoleonic Code.[55] It drew from the existing Hanafi literature on legal maxims (qawāʿid fiqhiyya) and to a great degree favoured the opinions of the late Hanafi tradition.[56] However, the Mecelle also marked the state's assumption of control over jurisprudence, which had previously been the purview of the decentralized juristic community.[57]

[edit]

The legal theory (usul al-fiqh) of the Hanafi school recognises the following sources of law, listed in order of epistemic authority: the Quran, the practices and sayings of Muhammad (sunnah) as documented in the hadith, consensus of opinion (ijma), qiyas, istihsan and local customs (urf).[58] Texts with equal epistemic authority may modify each other; if they are of differing levels, the text with the weaker epistemic authority is rejected in favour of the stronger one.[59]

Quran

[edit]

The Quran is the primary source of Hanafi law. In Hanafi legal theory, it is considered acceptable to adduce non-canonical Quranic readings (qira'at) related by the companions of Muhammad as legal evidence, but they are not treated as part of the Quranic text.[4] Classical Hanafi jurists are known to have cited the non-Uthmanic reading of Ibn Mas'ud but treated it akin to an exegetical gloss.[60]

Hadith

[edit]

The Hanafis categorise hadith as mass-transmitted (mutawatir), famous (mashhur) or solitary (ahad) depending on the nature of their chain of transmission (isnad):[61]

  • A mutawatir hadith is transmitted by such a large number of people on each level of its isnad that it is impossible for it to have been forged.[62] It imparts epistemically certain knowledge about the sunnah.[4]
  • A mashhur hadith is transmitted by a limited number of people at the first level of its isnad but was widely acted upon by jurists, beginning with their first generations.[63] It imparts epistemically near-certain knowledge about the sunnah.[4]
  • An ahad hadith, also known as a "singular report" (khabar al-wahid), is one which is neither mutawatir nor mashur.[64]

Only mutawatir and mashhur hadith may abrogate a Quranic verse, whether by replacing, qualifying or restricting its understanding.[65] An ahad hadith cannot be adduced in legal discussions of "great importance" as Hanafis assume that God would have ensured the reliable transmission of critical religious knowledge; nor can it be used if its early transmitters did not act upon it, as Hanafis assume that their inaction indicates that it is not part of the sunnah.[66]

Ijma

[edit]

Ijma refers to the consensus of opinion. Ijma may be explicit, with all mujtahids agreeing verbally or through actions, or tacit, where some express an opinion while others remain silent. In the Hanafi view, tacit ijma can only establish a concession (rukhsah) rather than a strict rule (azimah).[67] The Hanafis believe that the companions of Muhammad reached ijma on some matters, and some Hanafis regard agreement between Abu Bakr and Umar, the first two Rashidun caliphs, as being ijma.[4]

Qiyas

[edit]

Qiyas, also referred to analogical reasoning, involves applying a ruling (hukm) from an original case (asl) to a subsidiary case ('far) where both cases share an effective cause ('illah).[68] For example, because of the prohibition of usury, it is forbidden to exchange wheat and other commodities for each other unless the transaction is immediate and the amount of both goods are equal. The Hanafis extend this prohibition to apples through qiyas, as they identify the underlying 'illah as the exchange of a measurable commodity, and apples are measurable.[69] The Hanafis view qiyas as a means of revealing pre-existing implicit rulings within the law, rather than as a source of new rulings.[4]

If a ruling derived from qiyas conflicts with that from an ahad hadith, the Hanafis disagree on which takes precedence. One group argues that the ahad hadith always takes precedence, while a second group, led by Isa ibn Aban, opine that an ahad hadith only takes precedence if its transmitter was known to be a jurist.[4] Qiyas cannot qualify a general Quranic expression ('aam) unless it has already been qualified by a text with the same level of epistemic certainty.[70][4]

The Hanafis require the original case to not directly state the 'illah. The 'illah must be deduced by other means.[68][71] If the 'illah is stated, then the ruling is applied to other cases via the "indication of the text" (dalalat al-nass), not qiyas.[71] Dalalat al-nass is an exercise in linguistic interpretation rather than analogical reasoning.[72][73]

Istihsan

[edit]

Istihsan refers to juristic discretion. The Hanafi jurist al-Sarakhsi describes it as a means through which a jurist can depart from a ruling derived through qiyas to ameliorate hardship, where the new ruling is typically supported by a superior proof, such as the Quran, sunnah, necessity (darurah) or an alternative qiyas.[74] For example, by way of necessity, the Hanafi jurists allow a son to buy food or medicine for his ill father from the father's property without his prior permission.[75]

Istihsan emerged out of concerns among Hanafis that unrestrained qiyas could lead to results that were absurd or contradicted the sunnah.[76] The earliest Hanafis, including Abu Hanifa and al-Shaybani, more frequently used istihsan justified by subjective and pragmatic reasoning rather than on evidential grounds.[14] Their use of istihsan has been described as a form of "juristic activism" that sought to change the scope or outcome of a ruling due to its potential effects. More often than not, they deployed istihsan in a way that cannot be considered as ameliorating hardship, such as establishing the liability of a group of thieves involved in theft even if only one of them carried the stolen goods.[77] Subjective istihsan declined due to attacks from al-Shafi'i, and Hanafi legal theorists would systemise it into the form eventually espoused by al-Sarakhsi,[25] attempting to incorporate elements of subjectivity into the definition of necessity.[78]

Urf

[edit]

Urf refers to customary practices. The Hanafis consider it as an ancillary source of law that is subordinate to the primary sources of law.[4] Urf is divided into two types: general (al-urf al-'amm) and special (al-urf al-khass). A general urf refers to a customary practice that is widely accepted among a people regardless of the time period. As part of istihsan, the Hanafis permit favouring general urf over a ruling derived through qiyas. A special urf is more local and is upheld by a particular location or profession. Most Hanafis agree that special urf cannot qualify the general meaning of a textual evidence (nass), and that a ruling derived from qiyas takes precedence over special urf, although there is some disagreement on this.[79] Ali Bardakoğlu suggests that the emphasis given to urf in Hanafi legal theory can partly explain the spread of the school among disparate non-Arab groups.[4]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Arabic: ٱلْمَذْهَب ٱلْحَنَفِيّ, romanized: al-madhhab al-ḥanafī
  2. ^ Also referred to as the aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth.

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Esposito 2003.
  2. ^ Hallaq 2009, p. 37.
  3. ^ Younas 2018, p. 18.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Bardakoğlu 1997.
  5. ^ Hallaq 2005, pp. 64–65.
  6. ^ Hanif 2018, p. 90.
  7. ^ Sadeghi 2013, p. 128.
  8. ^ Hallaq 2005, p. 154.
  9. ^ El Shamsy 2013, p. 45.
  10. ^ Shahawy 2019, p. 21.
  11. ^ a b c Swartz 2003.
  12. ^ Younas 2022, p. 59.
  13. ^ Shahawy 2019, p. 21-23.
  14. ^ a b Shahawy 2019, p. 97.
  15. ^ El Shamsy 2013, pp. 24–25.
  16. ^ El Shamsy 2013, p. 27.
  17. ^ El Shamsy 2013, pp. 52–53.
  18. ^ El Shamsy 2013, pp. 47–48.
  19. ^ a b Younas 2018, pp. 26–28.
  20. ^ Tsafrir 2004, p. 17.
  21. ^ Younas 2017, p. 48–51.
  22. ^ Sadeghi 2013, pp. 130–131.
  23. ^ Younas 2017, p. 64.
  24. ^ El-Shamsy 2013, p. 47-49.
  25. ^ a b Shahawy 2019, p. 250.
  26. ^ Younas 2018, p. 31.
  27. ^ Younas 2018, pp. 131–133.
  28. ^ Hanif 2017, p. 144.
  29. ^ Younas 2018, p. 28.
  30. ^ Madelung 1982, p. 39.
  31. ^ Hanif 2017, p. 8.
  32. ^ Hanif 2020, p. 231.
  33. ^ Hanif 2017, pp. 1–2.
  34. ^ Hanif 2021.
  35. ^ Harvey 2021, p. 4-5.
  36. ^ Harvey 2021, pp. 30–31.
  37. ^ Zysow 2002, p. 264.
  38. ^ a b Madelung 2002, p. 43.
  39. ^ Khalfaoui 2012.
  40. ^ Hallaq 2009b, pp. 373–375.
  41. ^ Hallaq 2009, p. 80.
  42. ^ Hallaq 2009, p. 55.
  43. ^ Hallaq 2009, p. 78.
  44. ^ Burak 2015, p. 39.
  45. ^ Burak 2015, pp. 62–63.
  46. ^ Burak 2015, pp. 136–137.
  47. ^ Barak 2015, p. 124.
  48. ^ Burak 2015, p. 157–158.
  49. ^ Ayoub 2019, p. 66.
  50. ^ a b Ayoub 2019, pp. 92–93.
  51. ^ Ayoub 2019, p. 126.
  52. ^ Ayoub 2019, pp. 95–96.
  53. ^ Ayoub 2019, p. 96.
  54. ^ a b Ayoub 2019, p. 131.
  55. ^ Hallaq 2009b, p. 411.
  56. ^ Ayoub 2019, p. 150.
  57. ^ Hallaq 2009b, p. 412.
  58. ^ Dudgeon 2022, p. 68.
  59. ^ Hanif 2017, p. 50.
  60. ^ Harvey 2017, p. 89.
  61. ^ Hanif 2018, pp. 90–91.
  62. ^ Hanif 2018, pp. 93–94.
  63. ^ Hanif 2018, pp. 94–95.
  64. ^ Hanif 2020, p. 241.
  65. ^ Hanif 2018, p. 93.
  66. ^ Brown 2009, p. 154.
  67. ^ Kamali 2003, pp. 248–249.
  68. ^ a b Kamali 2003, p. 267.
  69. ^ Kamali 2003, p. 284.
  70. ^ Kamali 2003, p. 295.
  71. ^ a b Hanif 2017, p. 63.
  72. ^ Kamali 2003, p. 285.
  73. ^ Hanif 2017, p. 48.
  74. ^ Kamali 2003, pp. 325–327.
  75. ^ Kamali 2003, p. 338.
  76. ^ Shahawy 2019, pp. 56–57.
  77. ^ Shahawy 2019, pp. 99–104.
  78. ^ Shahawy 2019, p. 299.
  79. ^ Kamali 2003, p. 377.

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
  • Branon Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam: The Authorization and Maintenance of Interpretive Reasoning in Ḥanafī Scholarship (Albany, SUNY Press, 1996).
  • Dudgeon, Hamza (2022). "The Hanafis". In Leaman, Oliver (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Islamic Ritual and Practice. Routledge. pp. 65–89. ISBN 9780367491246.
  • Behnam Sadeghi (2013), The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6, "The Historical Development of Hanafi Reasoning". ISBN 978-1107009097
  • Nurit Tsafrir (2004), The History of an Islamic School of Law: The Early Spread of Hanafism (Harvard, Harvard Law School, 2004) (Harvard Series in Islamic Law, 3).
  • El Shamsy, Ahmed (2013). The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107546073.
  • Ayoub, Samy A. (2019). Law, Empire, and the Sultan: Ottoman Imperial Authority and Late Hanafi Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190092924.
  • Burak, Guy (2015). The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781316106341.
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hanafi_school&oldid=1266022380"